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Abstract:
In this paper, I study the wage differential between firms’ union representatives and
their coworkers using a linked employer-employee dataset. On the employee side of the
data, the surveyed workers are asked if they are unionized but we do not know which
unionized workers are union representatives. On the employer side of the data, I have
access to the number of union representatives and unionized workers in each firm. I use
this information to construct an indicator of the firm-level probability for a randomly
drawn unionized worker to be union representative. This indicator is then used to split
the directly observable wage differential between unionized and non-unionized workers
into two differentials: one between union representatives and non-unionized workers and
another one between unionized workers who are not a union representative and non-
unionized workers. Estimates that control for individual characteristics and firm-level
fixed effects show that union representatives’ wages are 10% lower than those of other
unionized workers and non-unionized workers. Additional tests suggest that this gap can
be understood as the result of a non-cooperative strategic interaction between employers
and union representatives.
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Introduction
France is a country of open shop unionism in which only few designated workers within
firms or workplaces represent all their coworkers, even those who are not unionized. In
this context, the strategic interaction at play between the employer and the few workers
representing all the others is unclear: on the one hand the employer can try to buy the
union representatives1, according them individual benefits in exchange for a less tough bar-
gaining; on the other hand, the employer can have the opposite strategy and discriminate
against union representatives in order to discourage further attempts to organize.
This paper examines this strategic interaction mostly from an empirical point of view.
I use a linked employer-employee dataset from the French private sector to show that
union representatives’ wages are lower than their coworkers’ wages. On the employee side
of the data, I only know if the surveyed workers are unionized or not. An empirical dif-
ficulty is the impossibility to distinguish, among the unionized workers, those who are a
union representative from those who are only a member of a union without being a union
representative. To sidestep this problem, I use available information in the employer part
of the data on the number of union representatives (there can be more than one) and the
number of unionized workers in each workplace. These variables enable to construct the
workplace-level probability for a randomly drawn worker to be a union representative. This
probability is equal to 0 for the workers declaring that they are not unionized (since union
representatives have to be unionized) and is equal to the proportion of union representa-
tives among unionized workers in their workplace for the workers declaring that they are
unionized. I use this probability variable to split the directly observable wage differential
between unionized and non-unionized workers into two differentials: one between union
representatives and non-unionized workers and another one between unionized workers
who are not a union representative and non-unionized workers. Assuming that these two
differentials do not vary with the probability variable (or vary according to a parametrized
curve), I show that they can be estimated consistently, conditional to workers character-
istics and firm-level fixed effects. The estimation relies on the fact that the observed wage
differences between unionized and non-unionized workers are more likely to be wage dif-
ferences between union representatives and non-unionized workers in workplaces in which
the proportion of union representatives among unionized workers is higher.
1Also called shop stewards in UK.
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Estimating a series of standard wage determination models that control for individual
and firm-level characteristics, I find that unionized workers taken as a whole are paid
2 to 3% less than non unionized ones. When the technique described above is used to
split this directly observable wage differential, I find that union representatives are paid
around 10% less than non-unionized workers wheareas the other unionized workers are
paid equivalently or slightly more than non-unionized workers.
In open shop countries such as France or in right-to-work states in United States,
workers do not have to be unionized to be covered by firm-level union contracts. In this
case, why do some workers are unionized and pay union dues whereas they could simply
be free-riders and benefit from the union contracts without getting involved? Workers
have indeed incentives to be covered nonmembers and act as freeriders unless unions
provide benefits exclusive to their members. According to the classical Olson explanation
(Olson, 1965), if a large group exists, it must have formed either because membership is
compulsory or because the group provides private goods and services accessible only to its
members, with ancillary provision of the collective good as a “byproduct”. An empirical
litterature tries to solve this classical Olson free-riding problem by showing that union
members enjoy non official wage premiums. In the United States, studies by Blakemore et
al. (1986), Schumacher (1999), Budd and Na (2000) and Eren (2008) find a membership
wage premium around 10%. In contrast, Hildreth (2000) and Booth and Bryan (2004) in
Britain as well as Bunel and Raveaud (2008) in France do not find any wage premium for
union members. This paper confirms only partly the results by Bunel and Raveaud (2008)
for France and shows that the membership wage premium is small but yet statistically
significant in certain empirical specifications. The main improvment on these authors’
seminal work is to consider separetly the union members who are union representatives
and those who are not. Doing so, I obtain a higher wage premium for members who are
not representative, which is more in line with the theoretical prediction of the free-riding
model.
The real novelty of this paper is to focuss mainly on union representatives: to my
knowledge, it is the first piece of work in the economic litterature that looks at union
representatives’ wages. There are two explanations for this lack of interest. First, data on
union representatives’ wage seem to be scarce or even nonexistent. Second, the situation
of union representatives does not always appear as a valuable research question. In the
U.S., there is a lot of evidence that anti-union policies and discrimination take place when
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a union tries to organize a firm (see Bronfenbrenner, 2009, for a recent study). Employers
also discriminate against prounion job applicants (Leap et al, 1990). However, unions
in the US are majority unions and once the union has won the right to represent the
workforce, it would usually have the power to prevent a company from paying lower wages
to a representative. If a company were to pay a union representative less, the union would
use the law and the contractual grievance procedure to fight back2. The legal settings in
the U.S. imply de facto a collective bargaining between a majority union and an employer.
In France, the five largest unions are officially recognized in a specific firm for collec-
tive bargaining as long as they find a worker in this firm who is willing to be a union
representative for them. This is a very weak legal requirement: union recognition works
on a volontary basis and there is no majority election. This weak requirement implies
that union representative can be isolated on the field since they represent workers that
have not elected them. An other implication of the French legal settings is that firm-level
collective bargaining between an employer and the workers takes naturally the form of an
“individual bargaining” between the employer and the union representative who defends
the interest of a community of workers to which he is not necessarily closely related. In
such a case, one can expect a strategic interaction to take place specifically between the
employer and the union representative.
Union representatives enjoy non monetary rewards due to their situation: they have
a work discharge (about half a day per work), they have a direct access to important
information about their firm, they participate to work councils and are consulted about
the important decisions their firm has to take and they have sometimes possiblities to
begin a political career. They might also enjoy a form of social reward by getting the
esteem of their coworkers and a higher social status. However, unions are present in only
36% of the private secor firms with more than 20 employees (Breda 2010). This is not a
very high recognition rate since the main unions only have to find one worker who accepts
to be their representative to be recognized. As a matter of fact, it appears that only 1
out of 125 workers is a union representatives. The workers’ willingness to become union
representative is in fact very small, which is a surprising result regarding the apparent
advantages that representatives can get. This paper also attempts to discuss and propose
an explanation for this apparent paradox.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes briefly the French institutionnal
2This point derives directly from informal discussions with Chris Tilly, from UCLA.
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setting. Section 2 presents the econometric strategy I use to measure the “union represen-
tatives wage gap”3. Section 3 briefly presents the data. Section 4 gives the main empirical
results. Section 5 discusses the different possible causal interpretations of the results and
provides additional econometric tests in order to identify the mechanisms at play. Section
6 briefly concludes.
1 Institutional settings
The legal settings of union representation in France have been slightly modified on the
4th of May 2004 and more recently on the 20th of August 2008. As this study focuses
on year 2004, I describe the functioning of industrial relations before these two laws were
passed.
At first sight, France shares with most continental Europe countries characteristics of
a regulated industrial relation system with multi-level bargaining. First, industry wide
agreements negotiated by unions and employer associations cover most of the workforce.
Second, individual employers can sign firm specific agreements with unions when unions
are recognized at the firm level. According to the Statistics Department of the French
Ministry of Labor (DARES), 97.7% of the workforce was covered by a collective agreement
in 2004. With a union density around 8%, France is the OECD country with both the
highest coverage rate and the lowest union density (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004).
In 1982, the Loi Auroux (August 4, 1982) encouraged decentralized bargaining. As a
consequence, industry-level bargaining became less significant (Barrat et al 1996). Some
of the existing agreements are even outdated because they have been rarely renegotiated
in the past two decades and are now weaker than national standards in many sectors and
regarding many topics. As a matter of fact, in 2006, exactly 50% of the 160 branches
covering more than 5,000 employees had a branch minimum wage which was below the
national minimum wage and was consequently useless (Breda 2010). To summarize, almost
all workers are covered by industry-level agreements but a lot of these contracts are weak
or even outdated, which gives an even more central role to firm-level bergaining in the
French multi-level industrial relations.
3Note that this presentation is not completly standard: since the measure of the wage differential
between union representatives and non-unionized workers (the union representatives wage gap) is subject
to technical difficulties, I begin in section 2 with a description of the strategy I use to get this measure.
Discussions about interpretation or identification of any causal effect will follow later in section 5.
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Firm-level agreements can be signed between unions and employers as soon as unions
have been recognized within firms. Concerning wages, these agreements can only improve
the industry minimum wage and must be above the national minimum wage. Three key
features differentiate France from Anglo-Saxon countries concerning union coverage at the
firm level: first, there is no certification election, second, many unions can be present in
the same firm and represent workers collectively and third, unionism is completely “open
shop”.
There is no certification election:
To be recognized in a firm with more than 50 employees, the main unions almost
only need to find one worker who accepts to officially represent the union in the firm.
Such a worker is called a union representative. 95% of union representatives belong to
only 5 large national “historical” unions. These “historical” unions are recognized as
legal bargaining units within firms as soon as a worker accepts to be their representative.
This is a fundamental feature of the French industrial relations: there is no certification
election required for historical unions to organize larger firms. In firms with size between
10 and 50 employees, unions have to choose their representatives among workers who have
already been elected, the so-called ”firm delegates”. These ”firm delegates” are legally
recognized non-union representatives acting as the voice of the workers in their day-to-day
relationship with the employer (they are generally also members of the work councils).
They are elected every four years by workers in firms with more than 10 employees among
voluntary candidates in a simple majority rule voting (the winning candidates are simply
those that have collected the larger number of votes). The process of union recognition
is more binding in firms with size between 10 and 50 employees, but even in these firms,
union recognition remains less binding than the U.S. certification process which requires a
majority of workers to be pro-union. The very weak legal constraints bearing on firm-level
union recognition makes it easier for unions to legally organize firms. However, the low
organizational cost paid by unions in these firms and the fact that they are not necessarily
supported by the majority of the workforce should limit their bargaining power and leave
the union representatives isolated on the field.
Different unions can organize the same firm:
The recognition process described above applies to each union, which makes in theory
unlimited the total number of unions that can cover the workers of a given firm. In
practice, around 36% of the private sector workplaces with more than 20 employees are
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organized, which represents 64% of the workforce in these workplaces. This discrepancy
is explained by the fact that the firm’s probability to be organized increases considerably
with its size. A particular union can also be represented in a working establishment by
up to five representatives, depending on the size of the establishment4.
Unionism is completely ”open shop”:
When one or more unions are recognized in a firm, in place and newly hired employees
do not have the duty to become union members, neither to participate in strikes. Finally,
union contracts negotiated by union representatives must apply to all workers in the
firm. Finally, the institutional settings concerning industrial relations and bargaining at
the establishment level are exactly identical to the institutional settings at the firm level
which is described above. Latter on, I use establishment-level variables on the number of
unionized workers and union representatives to estimate the union representatives wage
gap.
Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the way professionnal relations work in France.
The blue area represents a workplace. The yellow and red areas are respectively the
unionized workers and the union representatives. Notice that proportions on the figure
correspond to the estimated share of unionized workers and union representative on the
data sample used for this study (in each workplace, around 1 worker out of 10 is unionized
and around 1 unionized worker out of 10 is union representative). In what follows, I
compare as precisely as possible, the wages of the union representatives and unionized
workers to the wage of their coworkers.
2 Empirical specifications and estimation strategy
2.1 General framework with constant wage premia
I first provide a precise estimation of the wage differential between unionized and
non unionized workers that controls for individual-level observable characteristics and
establishment-level fixed effects. To do so, I present a series of regression models of the
4The maximal number of representives that can be legally recognized is 1 for workplaces with less
than 1000 employees, 2 for workplaces having between 1000 and 1999 employees, 3 for workplaces having
between 2000 and 3999 employees, 4 for workplaces having between 4000 and 9999 employees and 5 for
workplaces having 10000 employees or more.
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type:
ln(wij) = αUij + βXi + ηj + uij (1)
where wij represents the hourly wage of individual i in establishment j, Xi is a set of
observed skill characteristics (such as age and education) of worker i, ηj an establishment-
level fixed effect and Uij an indicator equal to 1 if worker i in establishment j is unionized.
In some specifications, the fixed effect ηj will be replaced by a vector Zj of establishment-
level covariates.
In equation 1, α can be interpreted in log-points as the within-establishment wage
premium for unionized workers conditional on their observable skill characteristics. These
unionized workers can be splited in two groups: the workers who are Union Representatives
(UR) and the other ones who are “Unionized Only” (UO). The wage premia for union
representives and workers who are “unionized only”, conditional on their characteristics
and on establishments fixed-effects, are defined similarly as the coefficients α1 and α2 in
the following regression model:
ln(wij) = α1URij + α2UOij + βXi + ηj + uij (2)
Let us assume that the standard identification assumption E[uij |URij , UOij ] = 0 is
true. In this case, α1 and α2 can be estimated consistently by conventional OLS regression
applied to 2. The problem is that the variables URij and UOij are not observable directly
in the data (see next section). The goal of this section is to recover the wage premia α1
and α2 using proxy variables for URij and UOij that are available in the data. In other
words, we assume that the wage premia for union representatives and workers who are
“unionized only” would be identified if these variables were observable directly and we try
to recover an estimate of these wage premia using an indirect estimation strategy.
Let us define by pj the probability for a surveyed unionized worker in workplace j to be
a union representative. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the link between the variables
Uij , URij and pj . Notice that if workers are sampled randomly -as it is the case in the
data I use (see next section)-, pj is simply equal to the proportion of union representatives
among unionized workers in workplace j5.
5If instead of being sampled randomly in each workplace, workers were selected according to some of
their observable characteristics (age, gender, etc), the probability for a surveyed unionized worker in work-
place j to be a union representative could be different from the proportion of union representatives among
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The key result is that the unobservable variable URij (resp. UOij) in equation 2 can
be replaced by the proxy variables pjUij (resp. (1− pj)Uij). In other words, we will still
have an estimation of the desired wage premium if we replace the dummy variables for
being a union representative by the probability to be a union representative. This prob-
ability is equal to the individual indicator of being unionized (Uij , which is observable)
times the establishment-level probability of being a union representative conditional on
being a unionized worker (pj). Formally, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Let us write eij = URij − pjUij . If eij is not correlated with the er-
ror term uij in equation 2 then the wage premia α1 and α2 can be consistently estimated
by OLS regression applied to:
ln(wij) = α′1(pjUij) + α
′
2((1− pj)Uij) + β′Xi + η′j + vij (3)
Mathematically, this means that E[α′1] = α1 and E[α′2] = α2.
Proposition 2: If eij is not correlated with the error term uij in equation 2 then the
variances σ2u, σ
2
v and σ
2
e of u, v and e are related as follows:
σ2v = σ
2
u + (α1 − α2)2σ2e (4)
Propositions 1 and 2 are prooved in mathematical appendix A. In the empirical sectionn,
I will estimate equation 3 by conventional (OLS). I will also correct the standard errors
of the OLS estimates and provide a maximum-likelihood estimator of the desired wage
differentials. Thse procedures are quickly described below:
Correction of standard errors and tests:
Calling σˆα1 , σˆα′1 the usual finite distance consistent estimators of the standard errors of
α1 and α′1 , we have from proposition 2:
σˆ2α1 = σˆ
2
α′1
− (X ′X)−111 (α1 − α2)2σ2e
unionized workers. For example, if union representives are older than the average unionized worker and
if the workers’ sampling strategy over-represent older workers, then the probability for a sampled union-
ized worker to be representative is higher than the proportion of union representatives among unionized
workers.
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where (X ′X)−111 designates the first diagonal coefficient (the one corresponding to α1) of
the variance covariance matrix of the regressors. This formula will be used in the empirical
analysis to correct the estimated standard errors and run the appropriate Student’s tests.
Maximum likelihood estimator:
There is a priori no reason why the OLS “indirect estimation” (IE) procedure proposed
above would provide, as in the case of standard OLS, the most efficient estimators of α1
and α2. I thus also compute the log-likelihood of the sample under the hypothesis of nor-
mality of the residuals and show that the maximum (log)likelihood estimator (ML) does
not correspond to the IE estimator.
Let us consider that the data obey to the following linear model (illustrated on figure 2):
ln(wij) = βXij + vij0 if Uij = 0
ln(wij) = α1 + βXij + vij1 with probability pj if Uij = 1
ln(wij) = α2 + βXij + vij2 with probability 1− pj if Uij = 1
with vij0, vij1, vij2 ∼ N (0, σ2)
For simplicity, I have included individual, establishment-level characteristics and the con-
stant term in the unique vector Xij . Doing this modeling, I have made two non obvious
assumptions. First, the return to observable characteristics β is identical for non-unionized
workers, only unionized workers and union representatives. Otherwise, I would be doing
a kind of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition estimated by maximum likelihood, which is not
our goal here since we would like to estimate an equivalent of equation 2. Second, the
standard deviation of the residuals σ is also identical accross groups of workers, as it is
the case in the OLS estimation. I will show that under this hypothesis the ML estimator
is not identical to the ME estimator. But later on, in the empirical analysis, I will allow
the standard deviations to be different accross groups.
We denote by w, X, U and p respectivly the vectors of the N observable variables wij ,
Xij , Uij and pj and by φ, the standardized normal density. The log-likelihood
L(w,X,U, p, α1, α2, β, σ2) = ln(
∏N
i=1(P (wij , pj , Xij , Uij |β, α1, α2, σ2))) can be written:
L =
N∑
i=1
ln[(1−Ui)φ((wij−βXij/σ)+pjUiφ((wij−βXij−α1)/σ)+(1−pj)Uiφ((wij−βXij−α2)/σ)]
(5)
It is easy to check that differentiating equation 5 relative to β, α0, α1 and α2 does not sim-
plifiy as in the case of OLS. Indeed, in the case of OLS, the ln functions have as argument
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only one normal density function which equals e−(u2i /2)/
√
(2pi). Consequently, maximiz-
ing the likelihood is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the square of the residuals. In
equation 5, this is not true anymore because the ln functions have as arguments a sum of
3 density functions that does not simplify. Consequently, the IE and ML estimators have
no reasons to be equal and estimates of the parameters that minimize the log-likelihood
defined in equation 5 will be presented in the next section as a robustness check.
2.2 Allowing for non-constant wage premia:
There are good reasons to think that the wage differential between union representa-
tives and their coworkers can vary with the proportion of union representatives among
unionized workers. If there are a lot of unionized workers for example, the representa-
tives will be less isolated on the field and it might be harder for the employer to either
discriminate or bribe them. However, we have assumed in proposition 1 that the measure
of the wage penalties α1 and α2 are constant and independant of pj . This is a usual and
implicit assumption that one makes when estimating a linear model. It offers a conveni-
ant way to get the effect of a variable on the mean of an other one. But the fact that α1
and α2 do not depend on pj is crucial when replacing the observed variable URij by the
proxy pjUij . Figure 3 illustrates this point in the simpler case with no control variables.
On the left chart, the wage differentials ∆wUR = α1 between union representatives and
non unionzed workers and ∆wUO = α2 between workers who are “unionized only” and
non-unionized workers remain constant when pj varies. The observed within workplaces
wage differential ∆wU = α between unionized and non-unionized workers has for equation
∆wU = [pj∆wUR + (1− pj)∆wUO]. It is a straight line. In this case, the estimation strat-
egy resulting from proposition 1 simply consists in estimating the slope and the y-intercept
of this straight line (which can be obtained by a simple orthogonal projection of ∆wU on
the lines y = pj and y = 1 − pj representated by dashed lines on the chart). However, if
∆wUR and ∆wUO are not constant with pj , ∆wU is not a straight line any more. This is
illustrated on the right side of the figure. In this case, the estimation strategy resulting
from proposition 1 fails to identify the wage premia for union representatives and workers
who are “unionionized only”. In the case of standard OLS estimation, a non-constant
parameter would be estimated to be equal to its mean. But in our case, the possibility to
estimate a wage premium explicitly relies on the fact that this wage premium is constant.
If instead α1 and α2 vary with pj , their estimation through equation 3 can be completly
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erroneous. To overcome this problem, I propose 2 solutions:
- When pj = 1, α1 = ∆wUR = ∆wU and is thus observable directly (when a sampled
worker declares itself as unionized in a workplace where only the union representatives are
unionized, we know with certainty that he is a union representative). I will thus estimate
α1 on the subsample of firms with pj = 1.
- I will plot the observable wage differential between unionized and non-unionized
workers for different values of pj and see if it varies linearly such as in the left chart of
figure 3.
3 The data
The dataset I use is the 2004 French Workplace Employment Relations Survey (RE-
PONSE04) conducted by the Ministry of Labor towards up to 10 employees randomly
drawn in each of 2929 business establishments with more than 20 employees. REPONSE04
contains extensive information on industrial relations at the workplace level and on the
firms’ organizational and technological structure6. In each surveyed workplace, union den-
sity, the name of the unions that are present and the number of their representatives are
available. I will divide the total number of union representatives by the number of union-
ized workers (which is equal to union density at the workplace-level times the number of
employees in the workplace) to get the proportion of union representatives among union-
ized workers. Net hourly wages in December 2003 have been retrieved from Social Security
records (the De´claration Annuelles de Donne´es Sociales, DADS) by the Ministry of Labor
for the workers surveyed in REPONSE04 and have been matched with the dataset. The
REPONSE04 survey covers mainly the private sector but some public companies are also
present. After cleaning, the employee survey contains 7836 workers for whom we have
the usual observable characteristics (education, gender, occupation, age, tenure, working
hours) and we know if they are unionized or if they have been unionized in the past and
are not unionized anymore.
6REPONSE follows the same design than WERS in the U.K. See Bryson et al. (2009) for a study that
uses both REPONSE and WERS to study unions and workplace performance or Blanchflower and Bryson
(2008).
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4 Results
The data appendix provides a table of summary statistics on currently unionized work-
ers and past unionized workers who are not unionized anymore and a figure showing which
observable characteristics in the data affects the most the probability to be unionized. It
can be seen in particular that unionized workers are more often men than women and
that the probability to be unionized increases with age and increases sharply with tenure.
The last table of the data appendix gives the distribution of the data workplaces in terms
of the number of unionized and non-unionized workers. Estimations of the wage penalty
for unionized workers that include workplace fixed effects rely on the 658 workplaces with
at least one unionized and one non-unionized worker. Even if the sample size is relativly
small, this number is large enough to run fixed effects estimations.
I start with the estimation of the wage differential between unionized workers (taken
as a whole) and non-unionized ones such as defined in equation 1. Table 1 presents
OLS and workplace fixed effects estimations of this differential with 3 different sets of
control variables. In the REPONSE04 survey, the workers are also asked if they were
unionized in the past. In all specification I add a dummy variable for workers who have
been unionized and are not unionized anymore. This implies that the omitted group to
which the unionized workers are compared is the group composed by the workers that
have never been unionized. The first specification, in columns 1 and 2, is simply a raw
differencial (with no control variables). We can see that unionized workers are paid in
average 6 to 7 percent more than workers that have never been unionized. However, within
workplaces, this difference vanishes (second column). In columns 3 and 4 (specification
2), the usual exogenous wage determinants have been added as control variables (age, age
square, tenure, tenure square, education, gender). Unsurprisingly, the OLS gap found in
column 2 disappears: the fact that unionized workers are older, have longer tenure and
are more often men explained entirely the raw difference. More strikingly, when workplace
fixed effects are added in this second specification, unionized workers are found to be paid
about 5% less. To check if this observation is robust, I have tried in specification 3 (last
2 columns) to add additionnal controls for occupation and working hours on the ground
that unionized workers can be segregated in low skill occupations and might work less.
The estimated within workplace wage penalty for unionized workers is lower but remains
very significant. The roughly 2.5% wage penalty that we find in estimates that control for
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workplace fixed-effects and detailed individual skill characteristics appears to be robust to
a wide range of other specifications that control more finely for the observable individual
characteristics. This result differs from the one of Bunel and Raveaud (2008) who found
a non significant wage differential between unionized and non-unionized workers. Table
1 also present the wage penalty for workers who were unionized in the past and are
not unionized anymore. In specifications that include workplace-level fixed effects, these
workers appear to be paid between the workers who are unionized and those who have
never been unionized. This result will be discussed in the next section which deals with
interpretation.
I now turn to the key estimation of the paper: the 2.5% negative wage differential
between unionized workers and their coworkers found in table 1 will be splited in two
differentials, one for union representatives and one for the other unionized workers. It
has been possible to construct a variable pj for 2081 workplaces in the sample. In 860
of these workplaces, unions are not recognized (there are no union representatives). For
those workplaces, pj is equal to 0. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the proportion of
unionized workers and union representatives as well as the distribution of the constructed
variable pj accross the other workplaces (those having at least one union representative).
In almost 10% of these workplaces, pj is higher than 0,9. The proxy variable pjUij has been
constructed for 7597 employees. 28 of these employees have declared to be unionized and
work in a workplace in which pj is equal to 1. These workers are identified with certainty
as union representatives. pjUij is the individual probability to be union representative.
Taking the sum of the variable on the sample gives the expectation of the total number
of union representatives in the sample. It is equal to 128.
Table 2 shows the results obtained when estimating equation 3 by OLS (the so-called
IE estimation strategy) and when maximizing the log-likelihood function 5 (the so-called
ML estimation strategy). All specifications include a detailed set of individual character-
istics as control variables (age, age square, tenure, tenure square, 8 education dummies,
a dummy for gender, 4 dummies for occupation and working hours). The results are
striking: in the specification that includes workplace-level fixed effects (column 1), the
wage penalty is entirely beared by union representatives and gets as large as 8% for these
workers as compared to those who are not unionized. In the second specification, the
workplace fixed effects have been replaced by a set of workplace observable characteristics
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(6 dummies for workplace size, 5 dummies for age, 16 for industry and 8 for region)7.
The penalty for union representatives is even larger in this second estimation. However,
workers who are “unionized only” appear to be actually paid a slightly better wage than
non-unionized workers, which is consistent with the Olson explanation of collective action
(Olson, 1965). I provide standard errors that have been corrected according to proposition
2 for all estimates obtained via the IE estimation strategy. I also provide standard errors
clustered by couple (workplace, Ui) since the variables of interest pjUi and (1− pj)Ui are
identical for all unionized workers or non-unionized workers in the same workplace. These
clustered standard errors probably slightly overestimate the true standard errors of the
estimators since they have not been corrected. The third column of table 2 gives the
estimates without fixed effects obtained via the ML strategy8. They appear to be close
and to confirm the results obtained via the IE strategy. In these specifications, I have
authorized the variance of the error term to be different for non-unionized workers, union
representatives and only unionized workers. Finally, the results in table 5 are robust to
modifications of the individual set of control variables, providing that the usual Mincer
equation controls for age, education and gender remain in this set)9
As discussed in section 2, the results in the 3 first columns of table 5 would be biased
if the wage penalty for union representatives vary with pj . Columns (4) and (5) of table
5 provide a first robustness check of the identification strategy. In these specifications, I
have excluded from the sample the workers having an unclear union status, that is, those
who declare to be unionized and working in a workplace in which the probability to be
a union representative is neither 0 nor 1. After this cleaning, the sample (in column 5)
comprises 6416 non unionized workers (none of these workers have been removed from
the sample) and 114 unionized workers. 27 of these unionized workers are identified
with certainty as union representatives and and the remaining 87 as workers who are
“only unionized”. Point estimates in these specifications are a bit lower (gaps are larger)
7Of course, the regression model with no fixed effects leads to a more imprecise measure of the wage
differential between union representatives and their workplace’s coworkers. However, it is less demanding
for the data. Since the dataset I use is relatively small and since my estimation is indirect, I believe that
it is important to estimate this model too.
8the ML estimator with workplace fixed effects is computationally to intensive to be calculated with a
standard optimization algorithm on a standard computer (after several months, it still failed to converge
and I had to stop the process).
9No results are not reported but they are available on demand.
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and standard deviations a bit higher, but the results of the previous specifications are
corroborated. Figure 5 plots the observable wage differential between unionized and non-
unionized workers for different values of pj . More precisely, I have reported the estimated
wage differential between unionied and non-unionized workers (conditional on observable
charcteristics) in the 2 groups of establishments with pj = 0 and pj = 1 (those are identical
to the estimates in the last columns of table 5). I have then divided the workplaces having
pj strictly between 0 and 1 in 4 quartiles and reported on the plot the average pj and
the average conditional wage differential in each of these groups. In each case, the wage
differential increases regularly from virtually 0 in establishments where pj = 0 to 10% or
more in those where pj = 1. Even though the estimated functions α(pj) = δwu(pj) are
not perfectly linear as in the theoretical case exposed on the left panel of figure 3, they do
not exhibit any abnormal point.
5 Discussion and causal tests
Why are union representatives so badly paid? Two usual explanations are possi-
ble: discrimination and adverse selection. Keeping the previous notations (without the j
subscript) and denoting by θi the productivity of worker i, we can give a mathematical
definition of these 2 usual statistical notions in the context of this study:
 - Discrimination (taste based): E[wi|θi, URi = 1] < E[wi|θi, URi = 0]- Adverse selection: E[θi|Xi, URi = 1] < E[θi|Xi, URi = 0]
Statistical discrimination on wages is impossible in the long run. Indeed, there is
statisitical discrimination if the employer does not observe a worker productivity and lower
this worker’s wage regarding an observable non productive characteristic (such as gender,
race or union status) because he knows or thinks that this unproductive characteristic
is correlated with some unobservable component of productivity (for example lazyness is
unobservable and affects productivity and the employer thinks that unionized workers are
more lazy). In the long run, unionized workers average productivity is observed by the
employer and lower wages can only reflect adverse selection (unionized workers are indeed
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more lazy) or actual taste based discrimination (unionized workers are not more lazy, the
employer knows it but still he pays them a lower wage).
The legal settings in France tend to isolate the union representives on the field and
to turn collective bargaining into a more individual bargaining between the employer
and the representative. Consequently, a specific strategic interaction can then take place
between the employer and the few union representatives in the firm. A careful look at
the incentives of the employers in this strategic game shows that they can rationally have
interest to hurt the representive to discourage other workers to become representatives
and to discourage further attempts to organize. In that sense, the term “taste based
discrimination” is misleading even though the employer consciously pays to the union
representatives wages that are lower than their productivity. From a statistical point of
vue, we can speak about discrimination. However, from an industrial organization point of
vue, the potential discrimination should probably be seen as the result of a non-cooperative
strategic interaction between the employer and the union representatives.
I do not have an experimental design that enables to identify with certainty the causal
explanation of the wage penalty for union representatives. An informal argument sup-
port the “discrimination interpretation”. The union representatives are drawn among the
unionized workers and they probably share with these unionized workers a lot of socio-
economic characteristics. This implies that they are not very likely to be far less productive
than the other unionized workers. Hence, the high wage differential between union rep-
resentatives and the workers who are “unionized only” is unlikely to reflect a selection
process because such a selection process would concern only the representatives but not
the other unionized workers who do not appear to be paid less than their non-unionized
counterparts. However, the law gives to union representatives a roughly 3 hours a week
work discharge for their union activities. From a legal point of view, the employer should
not pay these workers less because of their work discharge. These work discharges are in-
deed a legal duty whose the cost has in theory to be entirely beared by the employer. But
from an economic perspective, if union representatives work less, they might well be paid
less as a consequence. I now present 2 pieces of evidence that reinforce the discrimination
interpretation and invalidates the idea that the representatives are paid less because of
selection or because of their work discharges.
The first test I provide consists in separating the representatives according to their
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tenure. If discrimination is at play, it cannot happen instantly. In practice, it can take
the form of a lower rate of promotions and pay raises for the representatives. However,
if the “bad workers” select themselves among the union representatives, this means that
the representatives are drawn from the bottom of the wage distribution (conditional on
their observable characteristics). In that case, we should aleady observe a negative wage
differential between the representatives with short tenure and their coworkers. Denoting
by STi a dummy variable equal to 1 for workers having less than 5 years of tenure, I
estimate in table 3 the following equation10:
ln(wij) = αST1 (pjUijSTi)+α
LT
1 (pjUij(1−STi))+α2((1−pj)Uij)+STi+βXi+η′j +vij
In the two first columns, the usual detailed set of individual characteristics has been
added as control. In the two last columns, only the exogenous characteristics of the Min-
cer wage equation are included. In particular, I do not control for occupation which can
be endogenous: occupations are affected by promotions, which themselves depend on the
tenure of workers and on potential discrimination against them. In all specifications, the
wage penalty for union representatives is beared by those having more than 5 years of
tenure. This is even stronger in specifications that do not control for occupation. Since
union representatives with short tenure are given the same work discharge than the ones
with longer tenure, these results show that work discharge do not explain the wage penalty
for union representatives.
My second approach to suggest that strategic interaction is at play is to look at the
wage penalty for representatives from different unions and to correlate the results to the
behavior of each particular union. In the REPONSE survey, the managers are asked the
number of union representatives of each of the French main unions. It is thus possible to
compute the proportion pj of union representatives among unionized workers for each main
union and to apply the IE and ML techniques to obtain consistent (IE) or most powerful
(ML) estimators of the wage penalty for the union representatives of these different unions.
Due to the relatively small sample size of the data, I have done it only for the 3 largest
unions and grouped together the other unions. These largest unions are the “Confe´de´ration
Ge´ne´rale du Travail” (CGT), the “Confe´de´ration Franc¸aise De´mocratique du Travail”
(CFDT) and “Force Ouvrie`re” (FO). CGT and CFDT are almost the same size and FO is
10Unionized workers with less than 5 years of tenure represent exactly 25% of the sample of unionized
workers.
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slightly smaller. Almost 70% of the union representatives belong to these unions (about
27% belong to CGT, 27% belong to CFDT and 15% belong to FO). CGT is historically
a communist union. Even though since the mid ’90s communism no longer stands out as
the dominant ideology driving the organization, its concrete counterpart of class struggle
still characterizes the action of CGT today. According to a large sociological litterature,
CGT can be seen as more aggressive and less willing to make concessions than CFDT, its
more direct rival. As a matter of fact, statistics from the Ministry of Labor show that, in
2002, 26% of the strikes in the firms were initially conducted by CGT alone and 33% by
an association of CGT and other unions, whereas only 10% of the strikes were generated
by CFDT alone and 24% by CFDT and other unions. Finally, Breda (2008) has studied
the union wage premium in France, that is, the average wage premium obtained by unions
in firms in which they are recognized. He found that CGT is the union associated with
the largest premia.
Table 4 shows the results. CGT union representatives appear to be paid around 20%
less than non-unionized workers. CFDT union representatives seem to be paid roughly
10% less in the IE specification with no fixed effects but this result is not very stable and
not statistically significant in other specifications. FO or the union representatives repre-
senting other unions are not paid differently in comparison with non-unionized workers.
The fact that union representatives from CGT, who are the most fighting and the more
able to bargain better wages for the workers in their firm, are less paid than union rep-
resentatives from other unions reinforces the idea that they play a non-cooperative game
with the employers which leads the employer to pay them poorly11. The results in table
4 also strongly contradict the fact that union representatives are paid less because they
have a weekly work discharge. Indeed, if this were the only explanation, we should observe
an identical wage penalty for the representatives of each union since they are granted the
same work discharge.
11It should be kept in mind that these last results rely on a small number of “observations”. The
expectation of the number of CGT, CFDT and FO union representatives on the sample is respectively
38, 41 and 26 individuals. In addition, those workers union status is not observable directly. But yet
results for CGT are very significant. This probably means that, conditional on observables, almost all the
few workers identified as likely to be CGT union representatives experience far lower wages. Of course,
standard errors and confidence intervals are large too and direct data on the workers’ union status would
be necessary to assess precisely what is the size of the gap. The 95% confidence interval for the wage
penalty experienced by CGT union representatives is [-25%,-15%].
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Interpreting the wage penalty for union representatives as the result of a non-cooperative
interaction between employers and them enables to solve an apparent paradox: even
though union recognition at the workplace level only depends on the presence of a volun-
teer worker to be a union representative, unions are only present in 36% of private sector
workplaces with more than 20 employees. How comes so few workers accept to become
representatives even though it apparently looks to be a privileged position (union repre-
sentives have a direct access to important information about their firm, they participate
to work councils, they get working discharges and they might also enjoy a form of social
reward by getting the esteem of their coworkers and a higher social status)? If true, the
fact that workers are discriminated and have to renonce partly to their professional career
when they become a union representative could be the hidden factor that makes such a
decision difficult to take.
6 Conclusion
This research has shown that unionized workers in France are slightly less paid than
their non-unionized coworkers. When this wage gap is broken apart between union rep-
resentatives, who bargain for all the employees in their workplace with the employer, and
the workers who are only unionized, a clear pattern appears: only unionized workers earn
as much or even slighty more than non-unionized ones whereas union representatives are
paid 8 to 11% less, even in specifications that control for workplaces fixed effects.
A non-cooperative game probably takes place between employers and union represen-
tatives, which leads the employer to discriminate against the representatives. Such an
exclusive interaction which does not comprise the other workers is made easier by the
French legal context in which union representatives are not democratic representants of
their coworkers (they are not elected). Empirical results reinforce the idea that a non-
cooperative game takes place: the most penalized union representatives are precisely those
from the least cooperative union and those with the longest tenure.
To my knowledge, this research is the first on union representatives. It has the vertue
to reveal an unknown important statistical fact that concern a lot of workers: in France,
even if unionization rates are low, there are still more than 1 million unionized workers
in the private sector and more than 100,000 of them are union representatives. This
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research thus shed light on the problematic situation of professional relations: worker
representatives should not be paid so badly as compared to the workers they represent,
especially because one of their main role is to bargain wages.
Finally, union representatives are not observable directly in the data and their potential
number (128) is relatively small. I call for further research on this topic and direct data
collection on union representatives in order to get more precise estimates of the exact value
of the wage differential betwen union representatives and the workers they represent.
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Mathematical appendix: Proof of propositions 1 and 2.
The term eij = URij − pjUij can be seen as a measurement error: the difference between
the fact and the probability to be a union representative. By construction, this term
verifies 2 properties enonced in the following lemmas:
Lemma 1: E[eij ] = 0
Proof: We have E[eij |Uij = 0] = 0 (because non-unionized workers cannot be union
representatives) and E[eij |Uij = 1] = P (URij = 1)(1−pj)+P (URij = 0)(−pj) = pj ∗ (1−
pj) + (1− pj) ∗ (−pj) = 0. This implies Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: Cov(pjUij , eij) = 0
Proof: First, Cov(pjUij , eij) = E[(pjUij − E[pjUij ])(eij − E[eij ])] = E[pjUijeij ]. Next, we
have:
E[pjUijeij |Uij = 0] = 0
E[pjUijeij |Uij = 1] = E[E[pjeij |URij = 1]P (URij = 1) + E[pjej |URij = 0]P (URij = 0)|Uij = 1]
= E[pj(1− pj) ∗ pj − pj(−pj) ∗ (1− pj)]
= 0
Consequently, Cov(pjUij , eij) = 0 12.
Noticing that UOij = Uij −URij = (1− pj) ∗Uij − eij and plugging pjUij and (1− pj)Uij
in equation 2. We get:
ln(wij) = α1(pj ∗ Uij) + α2((1− pj) ∗ Uij) + βXi + ηj + uij + (α1 − α2)eij .
E[uij |pjUij ] = E[uij |URij − eij ] = 0 because we have assumed that E[uij |URij ] = 0 and
supposed that uij and eij are not correlated. E[eij |pjUij ] = 0 also follows from Lemmas 1
and 2.
Denoting vij = uij + (α1 − α2)eij . vj the residual in the econometric equation above,
we finally have E[vij |pjUij ] = 0, which is a sufficient condition to prove that the OLS
estimation of 3 provides consistent estimates of α1 and α2.13
12Note that eij should not be seen as a classical measurement error. Indeed, the classical error in variable
assumption that econometricians would have in mind when dealing with measurement errors would be
Cov(URij , ej) = 0, that is, the measurement error is not correlated with the true value of the considered
variable. This assumption is obviously wrong here since E[eij |URij = 0] < 0 and E[eij |URij = 1] > 0.
13Notice that the estimates of β and ηj could be biased if E[vij |Xi, ηj ] 6= 0. That will occur if
E[eij |Xi, ηj ] 6= 0. The measurement error eij actually plays the role of an omitted variable: not having it
in the regression biases the estimation for the variables that are correlated with it. As, by construction
pjUij is not correlated with eij , it follows that the estimates of α1 and α2 are unbiased.
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Also, if uij is uncorrelated with eij , we immediatly have that σ2v = σ
2
u + (α1 − α2)2σ2e .
QED.
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Data Appendix:
Descriptive statistics: distribution of current and past unionized workers in terms of their
observable characteristics (weighted).
Currently Unionized Previously unionized
Average 7,4% 13,3%
Gender:
Men 8,6% 15,1%
Women 5,6% 10,3%
Occupation:
Blue collar 8,2% 16,4%
Clerk 6,0% 9,6%
Technician 8,9% 14,1%
White collar/manager 5,5% 9,8%
Diploma:
None 8,2% 14,2%
Less than Bac 8,5% 17,1%
Bac 7,6% 9,7%
More than bac 5,2% 7,5%
Working time:
Part time 6,2% 10,7%
Full time 7,5% 13,6%
Sector:
Industry 9,4% 17,4%
Construction 3,7% 13,5%
Trade 3,6% 9,6%
Services 8,9% 13,4%
Region:
Ile de France (Paris) 8,1% 10,0%
North East 7,3% 16,5%
South East 10,2% 14,7%
Ouest 7,0% 12,9%
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Distribution of workplaces regarding the number of unionized and non-unionized workers
in the survey.
0 1 2 3 4 6 Total
0 258 57 25 8 3 0 351
1 432 122 37 10 4 1 606
2 541 145 49 9 1 0 745
3 420 126 31 5 1 0 583
4 288 56 11 1 0 0 356
5 159 31 5 0 0 0 195
Number of unionized workers
N
u m
b e
r  
o f
 n
o n
 u
n i
o n
i z
e d
 w
o r
k e
r s
6 53 11 0 0 0 0 64
7 19 0 0 0 0 0 19
8 7 1 0 0 0 0 8
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
11 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 2,178 550 158 33 9 1 2,929
N
u m
b e
r  
o f
 n
o n
 u
n i
o n
i z
e d
 w
o r
k e
r s
Probability to be unionized as a function of observed characteristics (estimate and confi-
dence interval)
Obtained via simultaneous smoothing using non parametric estimation.
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Tables and figures:
Figure 1: Within firm industrial relations
UO: Unionized Only, UR: Union Representative.
Notice that proportions have been respected: the relative size of the bloc corresponds exactly to
the relative share of each type of worker in the data sample.
Figure 2: Link between the variables Uij and URij
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Figure 3: Link between the different wage differentials when pj varies:
∆wU = [pj∆wUR + (1− pj)∆wUO] with ∆wU , ∆wUR and ∆wUO denoting respectively the wage
penalty for all unionized workers, union representatives and only unionized workers.
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Table 1: Wage differential between non unionized and unionized or previously unionized
workers, various controls.
1:FE 1:No FE 2:FE 2:No FE 3:FE 3:No FE
Unionized -.024* .068*** -.052*** -.010 -.026*** .014
(.014) (.015) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.009)
Previously unionized .009 .057*** -.046*** -.010 -.017* .011
(.013) (.015) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.010)
Control variables:
a) Age,tenure,educ,gender No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
b) Occup, work. hours No No No No Yes Yes
c) Firms characteristics - No - Yes - Yes
Observations 7836 7836 7741 7689 7356 7309
R2 .64 .004 .79 .54 .85 .66
Control variables in a) are age, age square, tenure, tenure square, 8 education dummies and gender.
They are all highly significant in regressions. Controlling more finely for age or tenure (for example
a dummy per age and tenure year) only modifies the results marginally.
Control variables in b) are 4 dummies for blue collars, clerks, technicians and managers, a dummy
for part time workers and the number of hours worked per week. Controlling more finely for
occupation (24 groups) only modifies the results marginally.
Control variables in c) are 8 region dummies, 16 sector dummies, 6 dummies for the workplace
size, 5 dummies for the workplace age and a dummy for the presence of a union representative.
Controlling more finely for size and age only affects the results marginally.
*: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the proportion of unionized workers, of the number and propor-
tion of union representatives and of the variable pj accross workplaces where unions are
recognized (e.g. with at least one union representative).
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Table 2: IE and ML estimators of the wage differentials between union representatives or
only unionized workers and non-unionized workers.
IE ML OLS: pj ∈ {0.1}
1:FE 2:No FE 4:No FE 5:FE 6:No FE
Union Representative -0.079** -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.095* -0.149***
st dev a (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.060) (0.048)
Corrected st dev (0.036) (0.034)
Unionized Only -0.012 0.036** 0.030** -0.005 0.010
st dev a (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.028)
Corrected st dev (0.014) (0.013)
Indiv. controls Detailed Detailed Detailed Detailed Detailed
Firm controls No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 7123 6729 6729 6530 6144
R2 0.86 0.66 - 0.87 0.66
a: In specifications (1) and (2), standard errors have been clustered by groups of workers with the
same observable union status (unionized or not) in the same workplace. In specifications (5) and
(6), standard errors are robust.
Individual control variables correspond to specification 3 in table 1. They include controls for age,
tenure, education, occupation, gender and hours worked. Workplace control variables in non FE
estimations are size, age, sector and region dummies.
*: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 5: Estimation of the wage differential between unionized and non unionized workers
when the probability for unionized workers to be union delegate increases
The estimations are obtained by running on 6 subsamples of the dataset OLS regressions that
include detailed controls for individual characteristics and either controls for workplaces charac-
teristics or workplaces fixed effects.
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Table 3: Estimation of the wage differentials between union representatives and non-
unionized workers for workers with long and short tenure
Indirect Estimation (IE)
FE No FE FE No FE
Union Rep. with tenure< 5 years 0.013 -0.029 0.041 -0.050
(0.068) (0.053) (0.119) (0.069)
Union Rep. with tenure≥ 5 years -0.108*** -0.141*** -0.134*** -0.186***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044)
Indiv. controls Detailed Detailed Standard Standard
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 7123 6729 7494 7085
R2 0.86 0.66 0.79 0.54
Standard errors have been clustered by groups of workers with the same observable union and
tenure status (unionized or not, less or more than 5 years of tenure) in the same workplace.
A dummy variable for workers with more than 5 years of tenure (not interacted with other
variables) has been added as an additional control.
Standard individual control variables are age, age square, tenure, tenure square, education
(8 groups) and gender. Detailed individual control variables also include occupation (4
groups), a dummy for part time positions and hours worked. Workplace control variables in
non FE estimations are size (6 groups), age (5 groups), 16 industry dummies and 9 region
dummies.
*: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level. ***: significant at the 1%
level.
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Table 4: IE and ML estimators of the wage differentials between union representatives or
only unionized workers and non-unionized workers
IE ML
1:FE 1:OLS No FE
UR CGT -0,222*** -0,206*** -0,200***
st dev a (0,063) (0,076) (0,056)
UR CFDT -0,012 -0,123** -0,066
st dev a (0,077) (0,056) (0,052)
UR FO 0,014 0,011 -0,034
st dev a (0,078) (0,081) (0,081)
UR other unions -0,028 -0,025 -0,045
st dev a (0,052) (0,065) (0,054)
Indiv. controls Detailed Detailed Detailed
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Observations 7133 6738 6738
a: In IE estimations, standard errors have been clustered by
groups of workers with the same observable union status (union-
ized or not) in the same workplace.
Individual control variables are controls for age, age square,
tenure, tenure square, education (8 groups), occupation (4
groups), gender, part time, and hours worked. Workplace con-
trol variables in non FE estimations are size (6 groups), age (5
groups), 16 industry dummies and 9 region dummies.
*: significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level.
***: significant at the 1% level.
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